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CONFLICT OF LAWs-TAATION-EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT
OF REVENUE LAWS
California. v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1952),
260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1953), 348 U.S. 932 (1955)
In 1936 Mary Agnes Rogers executed a trust indenture in St. Louis
by which she transferred the major part of her property to the St.
Louis Union Trust Company as trustee and named herself recipient
of the net trust income for life. Subsequently, Miss Rogers moved to
California where she died in 1945. The State of California assessed
an inheritance tax of $6,230.96 on the Rogers estate.1 Because the
estate's assets located in California were insufficient to cover the tax
assessment,2 California brought suit in Missouri against the trustee,
St. Louis Union Trust Company, to collect the deficiency.
At trial in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County the plaintiff relied
on the Missouri case of State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v.
Rodgers3 in which the St. Louis Court of Appeals departed from the
general rule that the courts of one state will not enforce the revenue
laws of another state4 and thereby permitted Oklahoma to collect an
income tax assessed under Oklahoma law.- In the principal case the
trial court followed the Rodgers decision and allowed recovery by
California. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri
on the ground that the plaintiff's use in Missouri of the California
assessment proceeding as evidence to prove its case "was without due
process of law."6 The Supreme Court of Missouri, relying on St. Louis
v. Butler Co.,7 ruled that the constitutional question had not been
properly raised. In the Butler Co. case it was held that in order to
properly present a constitutional question a party must raise the
point with particularity at the first possible moment and must continue
to raise the question at every succeeding opportunity. In the principal
case the defendant failed to meet this requirement because its answer
to the plaintiff's petition failed to mention specifically how the use of
1. The net taxable estate was $98,152.27. All but $537.37 of this consisted of
the trust corpus under the 1936 trust indenture. Brief for Petitioner, p. 18,
California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
2. See note 1 supra.
3. 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946).
4. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929); Colorado v. Harbeck, 232
N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); In Te Bliss' Estate, 121 Misc. 773, 202 N.Y.
Supp. 185 (Surr. Ct. 1923); GOODRICH, CoNFLIcTs OF LAW 165 (3d ed. 1949).
5. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 1464, 1483 (1941).
6. California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Mo. 1952).
7. 358 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (1949).
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the California proceeding as evidence in Missouri violated the defen-
dant's constitutional rights, and also failed to specify what section of
what constitution, state or federal, had been violated." The case was
therefore transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals for disposition
on matters other than the constitutional question.
The St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the judgment which had
been entered for the plaintiff by the trial court., This decision was
based on the theory that the inheritance tax statute on which Califor-
nia was proceeding did not create a transitory cause of action but
provided a remedy which could be pursued only in a specific court in
California-the probate court of the county in which the decedent was
domiciled at the time of her death.10
The basis of the court's decision-that California law created an
intransitory cause of action-is open to question. The inheritance tax
provision would appear to be nothing more than a venue laying pro-
vision similar to other provisions existing in California and other
states which lay venue for all causes of action whether they sound in
tort, contract, or any other type of action.1 This conclusion is fortified
by the fact that California had at the time the suit was instituted a
statute authorizing the Attorney General of California to bring suit
in other states for all taxes due the State of California.1 2 While this
8. California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 248 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Mo. 1952).
9. California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App. 1953).
10. See CAL. Rzv. Aim TAX. CODE ANN. § 14652 (1952). The St. Louis Court
of A ppeals also placed some reliance on two workmen's compensation cases:
Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 313 Mo. 225, 281 S.W. 762 (1926), and Davis
v. P. E. Harris & Co., 25 Wash. 2d 664, 171 P.2d 1016 (1946). These cases
should not have been controlling. The statutes involved in both cases specifically
disallowed the bringing of suit in a foreign jurisdiction. In the principal case,
the statute merely stated affirmatively where suit was to be brought; it did not
specifically state that the inheritance tax could not be enforced in another juris-
diction.
11. See, e.g., CAL. CODE OF Cry. PRoC. § 395 (1953). In Ohio v. Arnett, 314
Ky. 403, 234 S.W.2d 722 (1950), the only case adhering to the Rodgers decision,
supra note 3, the defendant contended that the Ohio statute under which suit was
brought created an intransitory cause of action. The Ohio statute set up a
number of procedural provisions impliedly to be followed in Ohio before unpaid
premiums for workmen's compensation could be collected. OmIo GEN. CODE ANN.
J 1465-75 (1940). The Kentucky court rejected the contention that the statute
was intransitory, stating at pp. 724, 725:
A statutory cause of action which is otherwise transitory should not be
construed as local merely because of accompanying procedural provisions
intended to be applicable only to the courts of the state creating the cause
of action, where the remedy is not an unusual one or one not uncommon to
the law of the forum.
It would appear that the Missouri appellate court should have been willing to
give deference to this persuasive reasoning and to enforce the California inheri-
tance tax statutes since they are very similar to the Missouri provisions on in-
heritance tax collection. Compare CAL. REV. AND TAX. CODE ANN. §§ 14501-14654(1952), with Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 145.150-145.180 (1949). The defendant admitted
this similarity before the United States Supreme Court. Brief for Respondent,
pp. 28, 29, California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
12. CAL. POLITICAL CODE § 3671(e) (1944) (now CAL. REV. AND TAX. CODE
ANN. §§ 31, 14350 and 16123.5 (Supp. 1953)).
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statute is in a different section of the California Code than the section
containing the inheritance tax provisions, it would nevertheless seem
to be applicable since all California statutes, regardless of their loca-
tion in the code, are to be construed together."
The plaintiff in the principal case, after failing to obtain from the
St. Louis Court of Appeals a rehearing or a transfer to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, filed an application in the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri for a transfer from the court of appeals.14 When this application
was denied, 15 California successfully sought certiorari from the United
States Supreme Court.16
It would appear that the plaintiff had several substantive issues to
hurdle before it could win a favorable decision from the United States
Supreme Court. The first obstacle was one of proof by California
that its inheritance tax statutes, contrary to the opinion of the court
of appeals, did create a transitory cause of action. Even assuming
this obstacle could be overcome, 7 there remained the contention, relied
on most strongly by the plaintiff in its argument before the Supreme
Court,18 that the construction by the Missouri court that the tax stat-
utes were intransitory constituted a deiial of full faith and credit to
the foreign statutes here involved. The Court has held that the full
faith and credit provision of the Constitution requires only that the
courts of one state attempt to give the same effect to a statute of an-
other state that the other state gives to that statute. 9 The Court
cannot examine every construction given by one state to the law of
another; to do so would be to enlarge the Court's jurisdiction beyond
all reason.20 Thus, as long as a state court attempts to give effect to
the law of another state no federal question of full faith and credit is
raised. The usual situation in which the full faith and credit issue is
13. In 'e Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 100, 168 P.2d 706, 712 (1946) ; Guardian-
ship of Thrasher, 105 Cal. App. 2d 768, 776, 234 P.2d 230, 235 (1951). The
court of appeals seemed to place some weight on the fact that a recent amend-
ment to the California statutes removes the authority of the Attorney General to
bring suit in other jurisdictions to enforce inheritance tax liability. California
v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 260 S.W.2d 821, 832, 833 (Mo. App. 1953). This fac-
tor would seem unimportant, however, since the amendment does not retract the
power of the state to sue extraterritorially for inheritance taxes due the state,
but merely changes the person to whom power is given to sue for the tax. The
Controller of California, and not the Attorney General, is now designated as the
official to bring suit in other states to collect inheritance taxes. CAL. REV. AND
TAx. CODE ANN. § 14350 (Supp. 1953).
14. Transcript of Record, pp. 151-156, California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
348 U.S. 932 (1955).
15. Id. at 157.
16. California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 808 (1954).
17. See text supported by notes 11-13 supra.
18. Letter from Walter H. Miller, Sr., Inheritance Tax Attorney for the State
of California, to the Washington University Law Quarterly, March 24, 1955.
19. Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458 (1905); Finney v. Guy, 189 U.S.
335 (1903); Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893).
20. See Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.S. 360, 368 (1893).
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presented occurs, not when a state court has attempted to give effect
to another state's statute, but when, because of the state's public
policy, a court intentionally gives no effect at all to the statute of a
foreign jurisdiction.21
The defendant in the principal case argued before the United States
Supreme Court that the Missouri court of appeals attempted to give
the effect to the California statutes that the California legislature in-
tended them to have, and that therefore there was no federal question
raised.22 The principal case, however, would appear to be more closely
analogous to the usual situation in which the full faith and credit
issue is presented than to the cases cited by the defendant. In those
cases relied on by the defendant, a lower court did at least attempt to
give substantive effect to a foreign statute.2 3 In the principal case,
the court of appeals made no attempt whatsoever to give effect to the
substantive provisions of the California inheritance tax law; the same
is true of the lower court in the usual full faith and credit case. Thus,
in both the principal case and the usual full faith and credit situation
the basic question is the same: Should the lower court have attempted
to give substantive effect to a particular foreign statute? The only
important distinction between the two cases is that the consideration
involved in deciding the basic question is of a different nature: In the
usual full faith and credit case it must be determined whether primary
weight should be given to state public policy or to the constitutional
requirement that one state enforce the laws of another state; in the
principal case it must be determined whether the statute involved
created a transitory or intransitory cause of action. The fact that the
consideration in the principal case is of a different nature than in the
usual full faith and credit situation would not seem to be a compelling
distinction-the basic question is still the same. It should also be noted
that in making an inquiry into the transitory nature of a cause of ac-
tion the Supreme Court would not be on new ground since it has made
that inquiry previously in at least two cases.24 In addition, the cases
21. See, e.g., First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342
U.S. 396 (1952); Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
22. Brief for Respondent, pp. 14-18, California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
348 U.S. 932 (1955).
23. The cases relied on by the defendant were: Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Melton, 218 U.S. 36 (1910); Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458 (1905); Finney
v. Guy, 189 U.S. 335 (1903); Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U.S. 402(1900); Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893). Brief for Respondent, pp. 14-18,
California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
24. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909). These cases
are distinguishable, however, from the principal case. In both cases, one state
had created a statutory cause of action which specifically provided that suit had
to be brought within the jurisdiction. Suit was brought in a foreign court which
intentionally overlooked the statutory procedural limitation and gave effect to
the substantive provisions. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
both decisions. The distinguishing feature is that in those cases the Supreme
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1955/iss3/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
relied on by the defendant stressed the fact that the Court would be
flooded with litigation if it assumed jurisdiction ;25 this reason is not
applicable to the principal case since the situation presented is exceed-
ingly rare.26
If it were accepted that the California inheritance tax statutes
created a transitory cause of action and also that a federal question of
full faith and credit was before the Court, there would seem to be
little to prevent a holding that the St. Louis Court of Appeals failed
to give full faith and credit to the California statutes. Even if a state
court need not give full faith and credit to a foreign revenue statute
if enforcement of it countervenes state public policy,27 still in the
principal case the Missouri appellate court explicitly accepted the posi-
tion of the Rodgers case that Missouri public policy does not oppose
the enforcement of foreign revenue laws.28 It would seem, therefore,
that the Supreme Court would have been justified in holding that Mis-
souri must give full faith and credit to the California inheritance tax
statutes.2
9
But no decision on the merits of the principal case was ever handed
down by the Supreme Court. During oral argument before the Court,
the Supreme Court Judges subjected counsel for the plaintiff to vigor-
ous questioning to determine whether California had preserved the
constitutional question in the lower courts, and at the conclusion of
argument, Chief Justice Warren requested counsel for the defendant
to submit an additional memorandum on the question.30 The Monday
following oral argument, after the memorandum had been filed, cer-
tiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted. 1 There can be no
Court affirmed a state court decision overlooking the procedural limitation, while
in the principal case, the Court was requested to overrule a state court decisionallegedly giving effect to the procedural limitation.
25. See Glenn v. Garth, "147 U.S. 360, 368 (1893).
26. Even if the line of cases relied on by the defendant should be considercd
indistinguishable from the principal case, it would seem that the Supreme Court
could have found for the plaintiff on the basis that the decision of the lower
court was clearly in error in determining the effect of the California statute. See
Eastern Building and Loan Ass'n v. ,Williamson, 189 U.S. 122 (1903).
27. See note 29 infra. For a case in which state public policy overrode the
full faith and credit provision, see Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532, 546-550 (1935).
28. See text supported by notes 3-5 supra.
29. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586, 624, 625 (1947). The Supreme Court has never decided the blanket prop-
osition that one state must give full faith and credit to the revenue laws of
another state, and the generally accepted rule is that a state need not enforce
another state's revenue laws. See note 4 supra. This issue, however, was not
argued before the Court in the principal case, nor was it urged in the lower
courts.
30. Letter from Walter H. Miller, Sr. Inheritance Tax Attorney for the
State of California, to the Washington University Law Quarterly, March 24,
1955.
31. California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955). Dismissal
of certiorari as improvidently granted is a comparatively rare decision. Such a
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doubt that certiorari was dismissed because the plaintiff, in its un-
successful application to the Supreme Court of Missouri for a transfer
from the St. Louis Court of Appeals,32 failed even to mention the con-
stitutional question.33 Thus, according to St. Louis v. Butler Co.,34 the
same case on which the plaintiff previously had successfully relied be-
fore the Supreme Court of Missouri,35 the plaintiff had waived the
constitutional question, and it is clear that the question could not be
reasserted in the United States Supreme Court.36
The principal case was unusual from the time of its inception until
its anti-climactic dismissal. Whether a similar case will ever arise
again in the Missouri courts or elsewhere is uncertain; however, the
Controller of the State of California has indicated that he will raise
the question again if the opportunity presents itself.37 The ironic
twist to the proceedings is that the plaintiff finally lost its case on the
same technical ground on which it had been temporarily victorious 8
-failure by a party to preserve a constitutional question throughout
the proceedings.
dismissal is usually based on a finding by the Court during oral argument or
upon further study that the basis upon which certiorari was granted does not
exist. STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 158, 159 (2d. ed. 1954).
For a listing of all the cases in which this action was taken prior to 1952, see
Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion in United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S.
288, 297 n.3 (1952).
32. See text supported by note 14 supra.
33. The theory of the application was that the St. Louis Court of Appeals
decision involved a question of importance and general interest. Transcript of
Record, pp. 154-156, California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932
( 1955). Walter H. Miller, Sr., Inheritance Tax Attorney for the State of
alifornia in a letter to the Washington University Law Quarterly, March 24,
1955, expressed the belief that this unquestionably was the basis of the Supreme
Court decision and that the decision was clearly correct. Local counsel had
raised the constitutional question in the application to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals for rehearing and for transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri, but
failed to raise the question in the application to the Supreme Court of Missouri
for transfer from the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Transcript of Record, pp. 151,
152, 154-156, California v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 348 U.S. 932 (1955).
34. 858 Mo. 1221, 219 S.W.2d 372 (1949).
35. See text supported by note 7 supra.
36. Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1947).
37. Letter from Walter H. Miller, Sr., Inheritance Tax Attorney for the
State of California, to the Washington University Law Quarterly, March 24,
1955.
38. See text supported by notes 7, 8 supra.
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